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We describe the epidemiology of inﬂ  uenza virus infec-
tions in refugees in a camp in rural Southeast Asia during 
May–October 2009, the ﬁ   rst 6 months after identiﬁ  cation 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Thailand. Inﬂ  uenza A viruses 
were detected in 20% of patients who had inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness and in 23% of those who had clinical pneumonia. 
Seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) was the predominant virus cir-
culating during weeks 26–33 (June 25–August 29) and was 
subsequently replaced by the pandemic strain. A review of 
passive surveillance for acute respiratory infection did not 
show an increase in acute respiratory tract infection inci-
dence associated with the arrival of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
in the camp.
P
andemic (H1N1) 2009 emerged in April 2009 and sub-
sequently spread around the globe. The World Health 
Organization issued a pandemic declaration on June 11, 
2009 (1,2). By October 25, 2009, >440,000 laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed cases, including >5,700 deaths, had been reported 
to WHO (3). The ﬁ  rst case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in-
fection was diagnosed in Thailand on April 28, 2009, and 
subsequently the virus was detected in all provinces. The 
Thailand Ministry of Public Health reported 27,639 con-
ﬁ  rmed cases and 170 deaths as of October 10, 2009 (4). 
Myanmar (Burma) reported its ﬁ  rst conﬁ  rmed case of pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 infection during the week beginning 
July 5, 2009, and by the end of October 2009 had reported 
<100 conﬁ  rmed cases with no deaths (5). Although most 
infections caused by this new virus have been mild, severe 
disease has been reported, particularly in young adults (6).
Data regarding the effect of inﬂ  uenza in rural areas of 
the developing world are scarce, as are etiologic data from 
refugee populations (7–9). A recent review of published 
reports from Southeast Asia concluded that inﬂ  uenza in-
fection may be identiﬁ  ed in up to 26% of outpatients with 
febrile illness and in 14% of hospitalized patients with 
pneumonia (10). In Thailand, seasonal inﬂ  uenza  virus 
activity peaks during the rainy season (June–September), 
with smaller peaks occurring during the cold months (Janu-
ary and February) (11). Incidence of inﬂ  uenza infections in 
Thailand was 64–91 cases/100,000 persons per year during 
1999–2002; the inﬂ  uenza-related hospitalization rate was 
21/100,000 persons during 1999 (11). Inﬂ  uenza infections 
in Myanmar are also seasonal; cases are documented pre-
dominantly in the rainy season (May–October) (12–14). 
Incidence data for inﬂ  uenza virus infections in Myanmar 
are not readily available.
Of 15.2 million refugees worldwide, approximately 
one third live in camps (15). These refugees often live in 
crowded conditions and have contact with populations from 
the host country and the country of origin, where public 
health infrastructure and surveillance may be poor (16,17).
Approximately 150,000 refugees from Myanmar are 
housed in several camps on the Thailand–Myanmar bor-
der. Maela Temporary Shelter (Maela, Thailand) is the 
largest of these camps, with a population of >40,000, 
predominantly of the Karen ethnic group, housed in a 
4-km2 area (18). This camp is located in the hills adjoin-
ing the Myanmar border, ≈500 km northwest of Bangkok, 
and has been in operation since 1984. Primary health and 
sanitation services are provided by nongovernmental or-
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ganizations. A ﬁ  eld hospital with an inpatient area and 2 
outpatient clinics provide free healthcare to the camp’s 
population, who do not have access to healthcare facilities 
outside of the camp. Acute respiratory infection (ARI) is 
a common cause of illness in Maela, but the proportion 
of infections caused by inﬂ   uenza viruses is unknown. 
Seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccinations and antiviral medicines 
are not readily available in the camp or the surrounding 
community.
In 2007, the US Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) and Shoklo Malaria Research Unit (www.
shoklo-unit.com) established a laboratory-enhanced ARI 
surveillance system in Maela. Pilot data were obtained dur-
ing late 2007, and formal surveillance began in 2008 with a 
2-day-per-week patient review in the outpatient department 
of Aide Medicale Internationale Hospital. In 2009, daily 
patient reviews were carried out in outpatient (from Janu-
ary 2009) and inpatient (from April 2009) departments. We 
report the results of this surveillance during May–October 
2009 and describe the impact of the current inﬂ  uenza pan-
demic in this rural refugee population. Data from our sur-
veillance activities in 2008, as well as passively collected 
ARI incidence data, are included for comparison.
Methods
From May 1 through October 31, 2009, trained local 
ﬁ  eld workers visited the hospital in Maela daily (Monday–
Saturday). Patients whose illnesses met clinical case deﬁ  ni-
tions for inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) or pneumonia (Table 
1) were identiﬁ  ed by clinic staff at the time of examina-
tion, and these patients were asked to complete an addi-
tional clinical interview. Inpatient and outpatient depart-
ment cases were included in the surveillance. From July 27 
through October 31, 2009, original clinical case deﬁ  nitions 
were modiﬁ  ed to capture each patient who had a history of 
fever during the current illness but who was not febrile at 
the clinic visit (either because of the intermittent nature of 
fever or self-administration of antipyretics).
A nasopharyngeal aspirate (NPA) was collected from 
each patient; a sterile 8-French infant feeding tube was 
inserted into the nasopharynx and then withdrawn while 
suction was applied with a 20-mL syringe attached to the 
feeding tube. The nasopharyngeal secretions and the tip of 
the feeding tube were transferred to a 1-mL tube of viral 
transport medium and stored in a cool box until transfer, 
within 24 h, to a –80°C freezer before analysis.
All NPA specimens were subjected to a panel of real-
time reverse transcription–PCR (rRT-PCR) assays for the 
following viruses: inﬂ  uenza A (separate primer/probe sets 
for inﬂ  uenza A [universal], pandemic [H1N1] 2009, sea-
sonal subtype H1N1, and seasonal subtype H3N1 detec-
tion) (20); inﬂ  uenza B (CDC in-house assay [details avail-
able on request]); respiratory syncytial virus (RSV; CDC 
in-house assay [details available on request]); and human 
metapneumovirus (HMPV) (21). An internal control PCR 
speciﬁ  c for the human RNAseP gene was used to monitor 
sample adequacy and to detect the presence of PCR inhibi-
tors (22). Positive and negative controls were included in 
each PCR run. A Rotorgene 6000 real-time PCR thermo-
cycler (Corbett Life Science, Mortlake, New South Wales, 
Australia) and SuperScript III One-Step RT-PCR Kits (In-
vitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) were used throughout. All 
laboratory work was conducted at the Shoklo Malaria Re-
search Unit microbiology laboratory in Mae Sot, Tak Prov-
ince, Thailand.
To compare virologic results from 2009 with our sur-
veillance data from 2008, we subsequently restricted the 
2009 dataset to match data collected in 2008 (i.e., we in-
cluded only patients whose illnesses met the strict case 
deﬁ  nitions and who were sampled on either Monday or 
Tuesday in the outpatient department). Clinical and labora-
tory data collected in 2008 were identical to data collected 
in 2009.
To estimate the incidence of inﬂ  uenza-associated ill-
ness, we reviewed passive disease surveillance data col-
lected by the hospital in Maela and collated by the Com-
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Table 1. Clinical case definitions for influenza virus infections in Maela Temporary Shelter, Thailand, May–October 2009* 
Condition (age, y)  Strict case definition (up to 2009 Jul 27)  Expanded case definition (from 2009 Jul 28) 
Influenza-like illness  Fever >38°C 
AND cough or sore throat 
AND does not meet criteria for pneumonia 
Fever >38°C (or history of fever) 
 AND cough or sore throat 
AND does not meet criteria for pneumonia 
Pneumonia (<5)  Pneumonia: cough or difficulty breathing 
AND increased respiratory rate 
(as defined by the WHO IMCI [19]) 
No change 
Severe pneumonia: cough or difficulty breathing 
AND >1 of: lower chest wall in-drawing, nasal 
flaring, grunting 
Pneumonia (>5) Fever >38°C 
AND cough or difficulty breathing 
AND abnormal chest examination 
Fever >38°C (or history of fever) 
AND cough or difficulty breathing 
AND abnormal chest examination 
*WHO, World Health Organization; IMCI, Integrated Management of Childhood Illness. RESEARCH
mittee for Coordination of Services for Displaced Persons 
in Thailand. This surveillance system captured data only on 
patients visiting the hospital for treatment. The number and 
incidence rate (calculated by using monthly camp popula-
tion census data) of clinically diagnosed upper respiratory 
tract infections (URTIs) and lower respiratory tract infec-
tions (LRTIs) were reported by month. No information was 
available to determine the number of ILI cases; therefore, 
we could not estimate the proportion of URTIs caused by 
inﬂ  uenza viruses in Maela. However, because most LRTIs 
reported are likely to be clinical pneumonia, we estimated 
the incidence of inﬂ  uenza-associated pneumonia as the in-
cidence of LRTI multiplied by the percentage of pneumo-
nia patients with specimens positive for inﬂ  uenza A. To 
determine the effect of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 on overall 
case numbers, we compared 2008 data with 2009 data.
Ethics
The Human Studies Oversight and Review Team of 
CDC reviewed the surveillance project and declared it to be 
a nonresearch activity, as deﬁ  ned by US 45 CFR 46.102(d). 
Therefore our study was exempt from the need for full re-
view by an institutional review board.
Statistical Analysis
All statistical analyses were performed by using 
STATA version 10.1 software (StataCorp, College Station, 
TX, USA). Categorical variables were analyzed by using 
the Fisher exact test; continuous variables were analyzed 
by using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (because none were 
normally distributed). Two-tailed p values <0.05 were con-
sidered signiﬁ  cant. Epidemiologic week numbers were cal-
culated by using standard criteria (23).
Results
During May 1–October 31, 2009, a total of 324 pa-
tients were included in the surveillance. Of these, 19 were 
excluded from further analysis; 18 patients did not meet 
the clinical case deﬁ  nitions, and no NPA specimen was re-
ceived for 1 patient (Figure 1).
Pneumonia was diagnosed for 234 (77%) of the 305 
eligible patients, and ILI was diagnosed for 71 (24%). 
For patients with pneumonia, median age was 2.0 years 
(range 0.1–68 years) and 55% were male; for those with 
ILI, median age was 1.4 years (range 0.2–10 years) and 
54% were male.
Fifty seasonal inﬂ  uenza A infections and 17 pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 infections were detected by rRT-PCR. Forty-
nine of the 50 seasonal inﬂ  uenza A infections were sub-
typed as H1N1; one was subtype H3N1 (Figure 2; Table 
2). No inﬂ  uenza B infections were detected. Median age of 
patients with seasonal inﬂ  uenza A and pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 was 3 years for both groups, but pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 was more restricted in age range (upper limit 27 
years, compared with 68 years for seasonal inﬂ  uenza A). 
Inﬂ  uenza A virus was detected in 23% of patients who had 
pneumonia (seasonal inﬂ  uenza A, 17%; pandemic [H1N1] 
2009, 6%) and in 20% of ILI cases (seasonal inﬂ  uenza A, 
14%; pandemic [H1N1] 2009, 6%).
Seasonal inﬂ  uenza A activity spanned weeks 26–34 
(June 28–August 29) and peaked in week 31 (August 2–8; 
the virus was detected in 80% of all NPA samples obtained 
from patients that week) (Figure 3). Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 was detected later, beginning on week 31 (August 3). 
Activity subsequently remained steady, with a maximum 
of 8 cases detected in a single week (15% of all patients 
sampled in week 36).
Seven dual virus infections were detected, all in chil-
dren <14 years of age: 2 seasonal inﬂ  uenza A plus HMPV, 
2 pandemic (H1N1) 2009 plus HMPV, and 3 pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 plus RSV. Dual infections were observed 
signiﬁ  cantly more frequently with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
than with seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (5/17 vs. 2/50; p = 0.003). 
Among patients admitted to the inpatient department, those 















































Figure 1. Inﬂ  uenza surveillance summary for Maela Temporary Shelter, Thailand, May–October 2009. IPD, inpatient department; OPD, 
outpatient department; ILI, inﬂ  uenza-like illness.Inﬂ  uenza in Refugees on the Thailand–Myanmar Border
with dual virus infection were not signiﬁ  cantly more ill 
than those with inﬂ  uenza A infection alone (3/7 vs. 26/60; 
p = 1.0).
Illnesses for 205 (67%) patients met the strict case def-
inition for ILI or pneumonia; 100 (33%) met only the ex-
panded case deﬁ  nitions. Age distribution and proportion of 
inﬂ  uenza A viruses did not differ signiﬁ  cantly between the 
strict and expanded case deﬁ  nition groups. However, a sig-
niﬁ  cantly higher proportion of patients with ILI (18/25 vs. 
6/46; p<0.001) or pneumonia (99/180 vs. 5/54; p<0.001) 
whose illnesses met the strict case deﬁ  nition were hospi-
talized, which suggests that the expanded case deﬁ  nitions 
captured patients with milder illnesses.
Overall, at least 1 virus was detected in 175 (57%) pa-
tients (37/71 ILI, 138/234 pneumonia). HMPV and RSV 
accounted for 120/187 (54%) viruses detected. These vi-
ruses were detected in ILI cases (HMPV 23%,; RSV 17%) 
and pneumonia (HMPV, 21%; RSV 18%). RSV was de-
tected signiﬁ  cantly more often in children <5 years of age 
(48/221 vs. 6/84; p = 0.003) and was more age restricted 
than all other viruses. 
In 2008, NPA samples were obtained from 74 patients 
meeting the case deﬁ  nitions on Mondays or Tuesdays in 
outpatient departments during May 1–October 31 (2 ILI, 72 
pneumonia). An inﬂ  uenza virus was identiﬁ  ed in 6 patients 
(3 inﬂ  uenza A, 3 inﬂ  uenza B); pneumonia was diagnosed 
for all. In 2009, samples were obtained from 35 patients 
with illnesses that met the strict case deﬁ  nitions in opera-
tion in 2008; patients were examined in outpatient depart-
ments on the same days of the week (3 ILI, 32 pneumonia). 
An inﬂ  uenza virus was detected in 9 patients (4 seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza A, 5 pandemic [H1N1] 2009); pneumonia was 
diagnosed for all.
Committee for Coordination of Services for Dis-
placed Persons in Thailand passive surveillance data for 
Maela showed that the median monthly incidence of URTI 
was 51.8/1,000 persons (range 30.8–66.1 persons) dur-
ing May–October 2009; incidence peaked in August. For 
LRTI, median monthly incidence was 32.4/1,000 persons 
(range 20.0–37.3), and incidence peaked in September. For 
the same months of 2008, median monthly incidence was 
36.1/1,000 persons (range 18.4–50.8 persons) for URTI 
and 22.4/1,000 persons (range 11.2–49.9 persons) for LRTI 
(Figure 4) (R. Sedhain, pers. comm).
Discussion
Our study demonstrates that inﬂ  uenza virus infections 
are common etiologic agents of respiratory infection in a 
Southeast Asian refugee population living in crowded con-
ditions. During the 6 months of surveillance in 2009, inﬂ  u-
enza A viruses were detected by rRT-PCR in 23% of clini-
cal pneumonia and 20% of ILI cases sampled, representing 
a considerable impact that this vaccine-preventable disease 
has among patients with ARI. 
Maela is an overcrowded and relatively closed refugee 
camp and therefore might be considered an ideal location 
for a novel inﬂ  uenza virus to cause an explosive outbreak. 
However, the number of conﬁ  rmed cases indicated that 
no major outbreak occurred in 2009. After the ﬁ  rst case 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was identiﬁ  ed in August, these 
cases increased modestly in September, then substantially 
declined during October. Overall, only 25% of all inﬂ  uenza 
A viruses were determined to be the pandemic strain. How-
ever, supportive data show a change of the predominant 
inﬂ  uenza virus. In late August 2009, seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
A (H1N1) was the predominant circulating virus; during 
the subsequent 2 months, only cases of pandemic (H1N1) 
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Figure 2. Age distribution of patients from whom specimens were 
positive for seasonal inﬂ  uenza (n = 50) or pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n 
= 17) in Maela Temporary Shelter, Thailand, May–October 2009. 
Table 2. Characteristics of patients with influenza A infection in Maela Temporary Shelter, Thailand, May–October 2009* 
Characteristic Seasonal influenza A (H1N1/H3N1)  Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
No. cases  50 17
Median age, y (range)  3.1 (0.3–68.0)  3.7 (0.4–27.0) 
Sex ratio, M:F, no. (%)  31:19 (62:38)  10:7 (59:41) 
Admitted to IPD, no. (%)  25 (50)  4 (24) 
Diagnosis
  Influenza-like illness, no. (%)  10 (20)  4 (24) 
  Pneumonia, no. (%)  40 (80)  12 (76) 
*IPD, inpatient department, Aide Medicale Internationale Hospital. RESEARCH
2009 were detected. During May–August, the incidence of 
LRTI and URTI in cases captured by the passive surveil-
lance system was higher each month in 2009 than in 2008. 
The rates of URTI were similar in September and October 
of both years, whereas the LRTI rate was higher in October 
2008 than in October 2009. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 did not 
clearly increase in case-patients with ARI after its ﬁ  rst de-
tection in the camp in August 2009. However, surveillance 
did not capture mild infections that did not result in visits 
to the outpatient department.
The occurrence of most inﬂ  uenza A infections in pa-
tients who had pneumonia most likely reﬂ  ects a sampling 
bias, although inﬂ   uenza is a generally underrecognized 
cause of pneumonia in the tropics (24). ILI is not a routine-
ly used diagnosis for the clinic staff at Maela, so most of 
the ILI case-patients likely were not interviewed and sam-
pled. However, when inﬂ  uenza A was identiﬁ  ed, pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 case-patients were less likely than seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza case-patients to have been hospitalized. This in-
formation suggests that, in this population, illness caused 
by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was no more severe than illness 
associated with seasonal inﬂ  uenza A. Several confounding 
factors, unrelated to the innate pathogenicity of the viruses, 
may account for this ﬁ  nding: 1) the timing of the modiﬁ  ca-
tion of case deﬁ  nitions in relation to the appearance of pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009; 2) differences in age distribution; and 
3) presence of underlying illnesses in the patient groups. 
Data regarding underlying medical conditions were not 
collected as part of this surveillance so the effect of other 
conditions cannot be assessed. To prevent spread of infec-
tion, public health systems may request persons with ILI to 
self-quarantine, which might result in underestimation of 
the number of cases identiﬁ  ed in clinic- or hospital-based 
surveillance systems. During the 2009 inﬂ  uenza season, 
announcements regarding inﬂ  uenza and the need for good 
hygiene were made on the Maela public address system; 
healthcare workers reinforced these messages by home 
visits. Whether this intervention had any effect on health-
seeking behavior remains unclear. An inﬂ  uenza triage sys-
tem was in operation at the hospital, but our surveillance 
staff had access to patients seen and treated in this area.
Our study has several limitations. Most importantly, 
not every patient eligible for sampling was included, fre-
quently because the patient refused or clinic staff failed to 
identify patients with illnesses that met the case criteria. 
These data were not recorded, so the effect of this bias can-
not be estimated. As previously discussed, ILI is not a fre-
quently used diagnosis outside this surveillance program, 
and most cases with this clinical syndrome were diagnosed 
as common cold. Many of the ILI cases documented were 
miscategorized in the clinic as pneumonia but were sub-
sequently found not to meet the case deﬁ  nition, explain-
ing the presence of persons hospitalized with ILI. Overall, 
these factors may bias toward sampling of case-patients 
who had more severe symptoms. Also, screening took 
place in only 1 of the 2 hospital outpatient clinics. How-
ever, because both are general clinics, the impact of this 
screening is likely to be reﬂ  ected in the absolute number 
of cases detected rather than in the proportion of ILI and 
pneumonia cases caused by inﬂ  uenza viruses. Regarding 
laboratory data, the likelihood of conﬁ  rmation of inﬂ  uenza 
infection is associated with the clinical case deﬁ  nitions in 
use: the strict ILI case deﬁ  nition used in our surveillance 
has a sensitivity of 98.4%–100% but a speciﬁ  city of only 
7.1%–12.9% (25). In another study, the probability of hav-
ing a positive inﬂ  uenza virus PCR was directly related to 
magnitude of fever (26). Therefore, given the bias toward 
severe cases, we may have considerably underestimated 
the impact of inﬂ  uenza in Maela.
As a result of the limitations noted above, we could 
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Figure 3. Inﬂ  uenza virus PCR results 
by week for Maela Temporary Shelter, 
Thailand, May–October 2009.Inﬂ  uenza in Refugees on the Thailand–Myanmar Border
not directly calculate the incidence of inﬂ  uenza infections 
in the Maela population. Also, given the mobile nature of 
refugee populations, calculating accurate incidence rates 
is difﬁ  cult, although the monthly census in Maela enabled 
generation of relatively accurate ﬁ  gures for this population. 
Therefore, because we detected an inﬂ  uenza virus in 23% 
of case-patients who had pneumonia during May–October 
2009, we believe the virus may have been responsible for 7 
pneumonia episodes per 1,000 population per month (32.4 
cases × 23%), which equates to ≈900 inﬂ  uenza-associated 
pneumonia cases during the 3-month inﬂ  uenza  season, 
largely because of seasonal inﬂ   uenza. For comparison, 
in 2 rural Thai provinces during 2008, inﬂ  uenza virus in-
fection was associated with 18.4% of hospitalized case-
patients who had clinical pneumonia (minimum incidence 
of 134.4/100,000 population) (27). Given the likely health 
inequalities between our refugee population and rural prov-
inces in Thailand, direct comparison of these datasets is 
difﬁ  cult. However, the incidence of inﬂ  uenza-associated 
pneumonia in Maela was ≈5× higher than in the Thai prov-
inces (27).
Population structure, such as the number of young 
children and elderly persons, may account for some of this 
difference, because the incidence of inﬂ  uenza infection is 
highest in these age groups. As with ILI, the case deﬁ  ni-
tions used may have affected the data or the use of dif-
ferent laboratory conﬁ  rmation tests for inﬂ  uenza infection 
may have resulted in considerable variation in disease rates 
between studies; the study in Thailand used RT-PCR for 
laboratory conﬁ  rmation. Although the rates of inﬂ  uenza-
associated pneumonia were different in the refugee camp, 
the proportions of pneumonia cases associated with inﬂ  u-
enza were similar (23% vs. 18%).
Methods of preventing or mitigating inﬂ  uenza  out-
breaks in a community include vaccination; use of antiviral 
drugs; and basic infection control measures, particularly 
good respiratory etiquette, hand washing, and social dis-
tancing (28). The World Health Organization has devised 
a speciﬁ  c inﬂ  uenza pandemic preparedness and mitigation 
plan for refugee and displaced populations, but implemen-
tation requires the coordinated efforts of healthcare pro-
viders (frequently nongovernmental organizations) and 
governments to ensure that control measures are available 
and used effectively (29). Because resources are likely to 
be strained during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, refugee and dis-
placed populations might not be adequately represented in 
a country’s pandemic preparedness plan. Availability of 
items required to control inﬂ  uenza transmission (personal 
protective equipment, vaccines, and antiviral medication) 
may be limited for this population without robust planning 
at the local and national levels. In addition to pandemic pre-
paredness, camp administrators and donor agencies should 
consider routine vaccination for seasonal inﬂ  uenza in these 
populations.
Continuation and reﬁ  nement of this surveillance as 
the pandemic continues may provide further insight into 
the epidemiology of inﬂ  uenza in resource-poor rural Asian 
populations. Work such as this solidiﬁ  es the need of inclu-
sion of refugee populations in inﬂ  uenza vaccine strategies 
and pandemic planning.
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